The article looks at fiscal constraints adopted by the U.S. States. It questions the ability of those rules to determine sound budgetary policies. To assess this point it analyses, in the general part, the major kind of constraints so far adopted. Of each major category the focus is upon institutional weaknesses that create the room for the adoption of circumventing practices. The following section focuses instead on three case studies, to show examples of the way in which the constraints influenced policy-making without mining the ability of government to adopt unbalanced budgetary policies. The weaknesses are combined with the adoption of a deferential approach by the Courts that generally legitimized the accounting devices adopted by the States. The outcome is a system in which budget policies are influenced by several factors that go beyond the institutional framework. On the other side, legal boundaries create distortions and unwanted effects in policies implemented by the States.
Introduction
The scope of this article is the analysis of fiscal constraints adopted by States in the U.S.A, looking particularly at the effectiveness of the rules they included, and the way in which they were able to influence fiscal policies. Two aspects in particular can be considered reasons for our interest in this matter: the different behaviour of States and the influence of their fiscal institutions on this, and the development of large state deficits, notwithstanding the constraints which were meant to limit this development (Poterba 1997: 56) . In particular, during the last economic downturn the budget troubles of the States raised serious questions about the ability of some of them to afford their economic obligations. These concerns have affected the Federal Government, and have been addressed in the scholarship. The first adopted a series of measures that directly, or indirectly, helped the States to be able to afford the costs of the economic downturn, In order to consider the issues that lie behind budgetary constraints, it is germane to note a preliminary point and clearly focus on the key problem of the instruments. This preliminary remark is connected to the origins of fiscal constitutional limitation among the U.S. States. The first wave of limitations dates back to the financial crisis of the1840s and is particularly connected to the default of several States. III Moreover, after the Civil War, the new States admitted to the Union adopted a Constitution that included a debt limit clause (Ratchford 1941: 122) . This element is relevant in two directions. On the one hand, the 
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duty or mandate to impose them existed upon the States.
IV On the other hand, the gradual and internal formation of these rules has resulted in broad differences between the tools States used and the goals that they tried to achieve. It links us to the key problem of the constraints: their effectiveness in binding the behaviour of the different administrations and their effects on the policies adopted by public governments. While several States have encountered financial difficulties, overall debt exposition in terms of GDP percentage remains low: moreover fiscal discipline varies considerably between States. This forces us to introduce some factors that could be relevant in assessing the effectiveness, and the effects, of the constraints. Firstly, several studies connect different rules to different behaviour among States: V it is important to note that what appear as influencing factors are not only rules that directly affect the budget, but also certain States' constitutional provisions such as the way in which the judges of the States' Supreme Court are individuated. VI Other studies have focused on the implicit purpose of these rules:
particularly looking at the way in which they are perceived, by the market, and by the States that adopted them, and how this element modified the financing debt costs. VII Other areas of scholarship note that the effectiveness of the constraints could be influenced by the politics within the States, for example being more effective in the very States that, for political and cultural reasons, have less need for them.
VIII
The intent of this article is to focus on aspects of each kind of constraint that erode their effectiveness. This phenomenon is created because of two elements: deficiencies in the articles of States' Constitutions or laws providing them and the interpretative approach of the Courts when challenged. Section II analyses the different budget constraints adopted by the States, grouping them in four categories: public purpose requirements, debt limits, tax and expenditure limits and budget bill rules. In each one we offer an interpretation of the weakness of the provisions and of the constraints that States adopted to circumvent them. Section III evaluates the consequences and the roles that these rules can generate in the budgetary process. The analysis of California, New York and Illinois will offer a useful perspective on the coherence of this approach. The States differ as regard to the constraints provided by their institutional framework. They all face severe fiscal crisis, notwithstanding that the budgetary, economic and political issues that they face are quite different. The analysis of these States allows us to assess the concept of the general inability of those rules to determine sound budgetary policy. In section IV we move on to a E -85 summary of the interpretative approach taken by the courts as regards the budget constraints; the intent here is to describe an overall trend that contributes to defining the general weakness of those clauses. Lastly, in Section V, we conclude by assessing some points on the effectiveness of the constraints and the role they play in determining the budget policies of States.
A Taxonomy of Budget Constraints. Weakness and Ways of Circumventing
States have adopted very different budget constraints, and thus the first element to be analysed is the typology of those adopted and their effectiveness. As we have also noted, constraints that were implemented were not a single moment's choice, but the result of a progressive modification of State Constitutions, often in response to the perceived weakness of earlier constraints.
IX The research summarizes four major categories of these, and to fulfil the purpose of our research in each subsection we try to highlight three elements: (1) features and scopes; (2) weakness; (3) ways of circumventing.
Public purpose requirements
The first type of constraint provided for in many State Constitutions was the public purpose requirement, X usually considered the weakest form of budgetary constraint. It basically consists of an explicit limit on the authority of the State Government to provide financial assistance to private enterprises (Rubin 1993: 143) . The origins of these limitations date to the crisis of the 1840s, when the finances of most States collapsed due to the large amount of debt contracted to finance private projects, -projects that failed to generate the expected revenues. XI The scope of the provisions implemented in consequence was to protect the public finance from uses that were not considered to be of public interest.
XII
The courts originally adopted an approach of strict scrutiny of these requirements, but they gradually eroded the constraints, beginning in the 1930s by admitting certain forms of development assistance, and in the decades after World War II by allowing some forms of direct government assistance to private firms. XIII The reasoning of the courts is marked by their deference to the legislatures in determining the nature of the public interest that the 
Debt limits
The majority of State Constitutions include limitations on debt (see e.g. Sterk and
Goldman 1991: 1315) , which can generally be divided between procedural and substantial.
In the latter case the constraints range from a general prohibition of debt, XVI to an amount limit, XVII to a cap using as reference wealth, revenues, XVIII or property -particularly for local government. XIX However, the more common debt limitations have a procedural nature. A very common one used is the enforcement of the requirements for approval, through a majority in the legislature, or as a voters' referendum, or in some combination of these. The main issue about debt limit was the breadth of their application. XXIII The constraints were generally designed to limit the contracting of debt to which state and local governments could respond with "full faith and credit": the debt limited -both in substantial and in procedural terms -is the one that takes the form of an obligation covered by the overall revenue capacity of the government. XXIV So, the State avoided the application of the constraints by developing several means to borrow without implicating their "full faith and credit" and full revenues' coverage. XXV The first tool adopted was revenue bonds: their emission was originally financed through giving to creditors the gains connected to the project -as for example a toll on bridge construction -to repay the contracted loan. The creation of a special fund to manage the project was considered by the courts as a valid reason to retain these debts not subject to the limits (see Ratchford 
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1941: 446-466). Progressively, however, the connection between project, bond and revenue has been eroded: the courts started to adopt a reasoning that also considered that new revenue sources or a percentage of an existing one could be reserved to this kind of project, if it could cause a relevant increase in the amount of the same.
XXVI
The other way to circumvent the debt limitation was to combine the restricted applicative perimeter of the constraint with a contractual form, through lease-financing and subject-to-appropriation debt: the bonds were emitted by private firms or public authorities to finance building activities -in the lease model -or projects that the government decided to entrust to them. At the same time the State made a lease contract for the use of the infrastructure or the services provided, that is used to cover the cost of the debt. The courts considered that the financial activities of these entities were not subject to the debt limits -even when they were fully public in terms of both ownership and managementbecause they lacked authority over taxes and expenditures of the government and so of the "full faith and credit" requirement.
XXVII At the same time the contract made by the government is not considered debt -and thus subject to the constraints -when directly connected, as an amount, to the debt service costs of the authority. This arose from different reasoning: from the nature of a payment for a service, XXVIII to the element that they are annually subjected to the budget and, particularly, to the annual legislative appropriation. XXIX Moreover, in the subject-to-appropriation debt the similarity to a loan is particularly strong: these are generally connected to a project of a public authority or a service provided and the annual financing from the government is individuated in the debt costs. The court, in particular in this case, had to strongly evaluate two elements to consider this kind of contract external to the debt concept inherent in the constraint:
namely the procedural element of the appropriation and the substantive element of annual limited liability. XXX In fact, the only purpose of this instrument is to avoid the accounting of the operation as borrowing in the budget, and to consider in it only the annual finance cost to the public authority: the purpose of the entire operation is to circumvent the State Constitution (Briffault 2003: 921-922 
XLIV
The impact of these limits on property taxes was particularly pronounced (see Sexton et al. 1999: 107) . However, the overall influence on the level of taxation and expenditures seems to have been limited (see, e.g., Shadbegian 1996) . One of the main consequences of these kinds of requirements has been the development of forms of revenue that are not considered taxes, such as fees, charges, and special assessments (see Galles and Sexton 1998) . Notably, while the courts generally enforced the limitations on property tax, they have been less restrictive with regard to limitations on other forms of revenue, XLV where a permissive interpretation was generally adopted with regard to special assessments, fees and charges. In all these cases the courts identified the absence of at least one of the features needed to identify something as a tax: coercion and potential for redistribution.
XLVI
The courts also generally validated the loss of the connection between a type of revenue and its purposes, consenting to allow the financing of an increasing number of activities through those non-tax revenues. XLVII While this interpretative trend was carried out to differing degrees among various courts, it is possible to identify an overall reduction in the applicability perimeter of tax limitation, as a result of the development of these policies by State Legislatures and the consent of courts to them. 
Budget Bill Rules
Lastly, we take a closer look at States' rules that became directly entangled with budget Looking at substantial rules for budget bills, it quickly becomes evident that it is difficult to determine how they may best be characterized, considering both the lack of clarity and the depth of differences between the provisions of constitutional texts.
However, four major types of constraints can be identified. 
LIX
States also made use of certain accounting tricks to achieve balanced budgets. One involved including in the budget expected earnings from the sale of particular assets: these estimated items have been revealed to be tricky both in the sense that they did not rely upon an estimated and credible perspective of assets for sale, and because they achieved a balance between una tantum revenues and recurrent expenditures (see McCall 1996: 17) .
Another widely-used stratagem was in accounting for a net gain achieved by an extension of debt, through the substitution of higher short-term interest rates with lower long-term ones, which improved the annual budget's ratio of income to expenses, but which increases the State's overall indebtedness. Lastly, States can use weaknesses in areas of the budget covered by those provisions to balance the budget with debt created in systems in which there is, in theory, a borrowing prohibition: they consider as positive items inter-fund transfers, so they can achieve, as an example, a positive item by a transfer from a special district that was financed by borrowing activity (McCall 1996: 27-28, U.S. General Accounting Office 1995: 64).
In the last decades, the impact of intergovernmental transfers on States' budgetary systems has grown to the point that the manipulation of these funds has become a major way to circumvent constitutional budgetary constraints. This happens through combining a reduction in expenditure achieved through spending cuts transferred to local governments, and an increase in funds gained from the federal level. In the first case, local finances have no guarantees in constitutions -except for some acknowledgments in respect of the education sector -and so it is possible to achieve the goal of a balanced budget through cuts in funds given to them.
LX In this case, the effects of the constraints are transferred to local taxpayers, who see an increase in local taxation, which compensates for the loss in transfers. In the second case, the States adapt their expenditure items in such a way as to shift them inside federal programs -especially matching ones which could also give an increase in the transfer received -so reducing the costs for them in their budget (see Briffault 1996: 27-30).
The Influence of Constraints on Budget Policies of States Facing Fiscal Crisis
The analysis presented above provides several reasons to doubt the effectiveness of financial constraints adopted by States. In this section the article examines the role played by these norms in determining the policies adopted by three of the largest StatesCalifornia, New York and Illinois -that faced financial troubles during the crisis. Each
State studied offers an overview of their budget structure, main problems in managing it and, particularly, the reaction to the financial crisis in 2008. The analysis shows the similarity between budgetary difficulties faced by the States, but also shows how none of the different rules adopted have been instrumental in determining sound budgetary policies, and moreover have had severe effects in other sectors.
California
In the case of California, the budgetary issues include the use of borrowing to achieve a balanced budget, the unfunded liabilities of the retirement system, the increasing costs of 
E -97
worsened by efforts to enact temporary policies to cushion the impact of the crisis. The first measure to meet the budgetary troubles was a modification that tried to limit spending growth. This was effected through two-year, instead of the classic annual, appropriations for education aid and Medicaid expenditures and through the introduction of new tools to check and monitor spending and balances. Moreover, an annual cap was applied to any increase of expenditures for the two biggest items of the state budget, defined by external parameters. Lastly, the executive was empowered with the facility to reduce Medicaid spending during the fiscal year.
LXXXII
The New York system is noteworthy for two elements that have made it one of the States in which many of the accounting tricks mentioned before were developed (see as an example Ravitch 2010). One was the choice to use as a parameter a cash budget, while the GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) criteria were used only for reports. The other was that, after the Budget Reform Act of 2007, only the general fund budget in New York has to be balanced.
LXXXIII Effectively, as the general fund covers less than half of the total budget of the State, no such kind of balancing provision was provided for the overall exercise. Moreover, there was also no requirement for the budget, once approved, to remain balanced throughout the fiscal year, and this opens the door to practices such as timeline manipulations or overestimation. Finally, the requirements of general fund balances, where extended into an evaluation of a multi-annual framework, are only contained in the Budget Reform Act, a merely statutory requirement that could be easily circumvented by the approval of subsequent legislation.
LXXXIV
In the fiscal behaviour of New York State a central issue to analyse is the constitutional fiscal framework. Article VII of the Constitution is totally dedicated to State finances. In this context, the powers of the Governor are particularly interesting. The budget procedure is, in fact, characterized by the strong role of the executive in the formulation, presentation and execution phases of the budget. To enforce these kind of rules there are exclusive powers provided for the Governor in the submission of items concerning the expenditure of the executive branch. Moreover, once presented he possesses a veto power, albeit not absolute, on items modified by the legislature, and can also modify some items approved in the executive phase. LXXXV So it is clear why, in this kind of system, the boundaries for a balanced budget concern, first of all, the Governor himself. The legislature affords several limits in the matter of budget choices. In a general way, the power that it possesses is concentrated on the negative side, in terms of the possibility of reducing the authority for spending or reducing proposed appropriations made by the Executive. However, in the positive direction, the legislature finds it impossible to substitute items proposed by the Governor or significantly modify the proposed appropriations. LXXXVI As a consequence the system is structured in a way that makes it clear that policy budgetary choices are part of the Governor's tools.
The New York Supreme Court, in Potaki v. New York State Assembly, rigorously evaluated such an understanding, clarifying different elements. It identified the scope of constitutional mutation in the alteration of the roles of executive and legislative in the budget process: the first must be considered the "constructor" of the budget, while the second has a "critical" role, in which approval is needed. LXXXVII Moreover, executive powers have also been extended with two considerations concerning the possibility to challenge the budget contents. Firstly distinctions between appropriation and policy are now considered non-existent, thus expanding the political doctrine perimeter. Secondly, there is no legal constraint that could be judicially enforced on the Governor that might prevent him from inserting substantive law changes in the budget bill. These elements have been combined with the exclusion of the amendment power of the legislative both regarding the budget bill and the policy conditions connected. This kind of instrument could modify the balance of power provided for in the N.Y. Constitution, which sought that the executive might not provide a "rival constructor" role to the legislative branch. LXXXVIII The effect of the procedural budgetary framework, combined with this interpretative approach, deeply influences the balance of power. The legislative power has no choice as to whether to approve or, through a refusal to act, to force an impasse with potentially devastating effects. As a consequence, the executive powers were broadly extended, including the ability to make policies beyond the budget, LXXXIX while the ability of the legislative to check the executive compliance to constraints has been severely eroded.
The use of accounting devices has been confirmed in the recent fiscal troubles: the primary way in which the Governor achieved a balanced budget was through cash manipulation, in particular through delaying payments to subsequent years. When the legislature blocked such moves, the only way to submit to the requirement was to make repeated use of temporary loans allowed for by the constitution. 
E -99
issue was about a short-term debt contracted to cover a year-end deficit. This case is particularly effective in demonstrating the misleading use of the legislature framework regarding States' budgetary constraints: the conclusion of the judgement was that the budget was not unbalanced even if there were successive years of unpredictable shortfalls that would force the use of short-term debt.
XCI As a consequence, a nominally balanced budget -achieved through borrowing -can be successfully challenged only in the case of a planned shortfall, or a deliberate alteration of fiscal estimates (in this direction, see Briffault
2009: 428-429).
Let me summarize some points helpful for this research. In the New York case, the difficulties resulting from the economic crisis were combined with a structural deficit imbalance in the state budget. The revenues were both inadequate to fund the spending indicated, and they increased at a slower rate than the latter. The formal balance was achieved through a combination of accounting devices: transfers from other authorities, delays in payments, and manipulating existing debts and assets. This element, combined with the annual need for a balanced budget, created a trend in which the budget would be balanced by the year's end, while projections for the following year continued to worsen.
As in the general reconstruction mentioned the constitutional framework encouraged the use of such stratagem: providing a constraint only for the general fund creates a strong incentive for the creation of a broad system of special funds. As a result, the manipulation of funds became widespread as a reaction to the fiscal troubles connected to the crisis. 
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Looking at the institutional framework, a first element to be noted is that the offices of the Governor play a key role in the budget formation procedure. The contents of the budget are determined by the cooperation between the Governor -fixing the budgetary objectives and directives for state agencies -and the Governor's Office of Management and Budget (GOMB) -that both collect the expenditure requirements from the agencies and make estimates for the fiscal exigencies required to accomplish the goals determined.
This process, built into the executive branch of the government, allows only a few actors to play a strong role in determining budgetary decisions. The legislature only has the power to vote on the final budget proposed, usually within a timeframe that makes a deep analysis of the budget difficult to achieve (see Nowlan, Gore and Winkel 2010: 215) .
One of the interesting points for this research, is that this situation of budgetary troubles has been created in a system in which the constitution requires that "the proposed expenditure shall not exceed the funds estimated to be available" for the budget year in question.
XCVIII The weakness of this constraint is connected to the possibility of adopting temporary accounting devices and in creating unrealistic estimates of available funds.
Moreover, also in the case of Illinois, the budget is a cash annual concept, which excludes accruals. These factors explain why the government has been able to achieve the required balance by postponing payments for pension benefits, so creating the massive amount of unfunded liabilities still present. The institutional weakness of the budget helps to explain the huge number of unpaid bills registered; considering that they are not considered in a cash budget as negative items, as avoiding or delaying payment could be a way to achieve the required balance.
XCIX
The budgetary devices that contributed to the financial troubles of Illinois included timeline and funds manipulation, and misleading information and planning. The more influential practice of timeline shifting was registered in pension obligation bonds. As mentioned before, the government also broadly implemented payment delay practices.
Funds manipulation, on the other hand, exploited the composition of the Illinois budget:
with the general fund covering only half of expenditure, one of the more common ways to achieve the required balance was to shift unbalanced items to special funds not considered as being in the constraint mechanism. Moreover, special funds were also exploited to create revenue: through sweeps and chargebacks, the government could take back, in the case of positive operating results, profits from special funds to finance general operations, through inter-fund borrowing or transfers, although this kind of operation, when challenged in the judiciary, did receive the approval of the Illinois Supreme Court (Wetterich 2011). Lastly, Illinois lacked two key elements that are considered central to assuring the financial stability of a State: a provision for multi-annual budgetary planning, and a duty to form reserves as rainy day funds.
C
The crisis partially modified this situation. As a first step, the legislature decided to force the Governor to make cuts by financing appropriation in lump sum amounts for the federal agencies. In 2012, where normal proceedings were resumed, the Governor introduced detailed controls in respect of the predetermined expenditure by the agencies and started to release official three-year projections of the General Fund budget. CI This confirms that also in this latter case, the institutional weakness has been perceived as a cause of the financial distress.
The interpretative approach of Courts
The data of deficit budgetary policies of these States require us to seriously question the extent to which constraints proved legally binding. By looking at both the general analysis and the case studies, we can see how States have been able to reduce the effectiveness of constraints through their evaluation in a restrictive interpretation. This behaviour has been possible for two reasons: one is the weakness of the rules as discussed earlier, and the other is the permissive position assumed by States' Supreme Courts.
According to Briffault (see Briffault 2003: 939-949) , it is possible to individuate some common motivations among the courts for this interpretative trend, which regards these provisions as a "disfavoured Constitution".
The first is that courts consider that financial constraints have more similarity with ordinary legislation than with matters concerning fundamental rights or government structure. This approach explains why different courts, when looking at these rules, make the point that, without the involvement of any individual right, questions concerning them are best solved by elected representatives, CII and that the courts must adopt a deferential approach to the legislature that has the responsibility of adopting States' fiscal policy.
CIII
These interpretative trends show some similarities with the deferential approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court after the New Deal, but within a completely different framework:
while the Federal Constitution is almost silent on fiscal elements, the States' courts must downgrade several parts of their constitutional texts into mere technical norms and circumvent them to achieve the same goal.
This leads us to a second element: the courts, perhaps considering the elective nature of their appointment, CIV adopt in the formulation of their judgements an approach that explicitly shares the policy goals of their governments. The broad interpretation of the clause of public purpose testified to this trend: considering that almost every kind of public expenditure could increase the economic growth of the State by being an expansive policy, the courts shared the same motivation that politicians had in disabling the clause.
CV
Moreover, when looking at debt limits, several courts had explicitly seen the deficitfinanced activities as a public interest to be promoted, so they considered the extensive use of accounting devices as discussed as a means to guarantee necessary flexibility for their governments. CVI It seems clear that a similar approach, evaluating purpose against constitutional rules, is a key element in explaining the ineffectiveness of the debt limits illustrated above. CVII This approach to the rules could also be connected to two other elements that could help explain the adoption of a more stringent one when looking at taxation rules. One factor is the absence of a right directly affected by the violation of the constraints, where in taxation rules, it is easier to find a subject that has had a direct loss connected to an increase. The other factor may be that the TELs rules are quite recent, while the other constraints are generally old and this could explain the consideration that in one case they reflect a value, and continue to have support, while in the other this element could be questioned or not considered.
Conclusions
Our research has focused on the dynamics between fiscal institutional rules and their The research seems to lead to the conclusion that federal intervention is one of the main elements that gives stability to the system: constant policies, implicit bailouts, and counter-cyclical programs partially absorbed the troubles of States, moreover they give them the financial space to follow voters' favoured budgetary politics (in this direction see also Henning and Kessler 2012: 14-15) .
This article has shown that the effectiveness of fiscal rules can be questioned on several grounds. However, these rules exist and, whilst ineffective, their presence is not without consequences. It is possible to summarize some distortive effects connected to them. The main effect is connected to the behaviour of States between economic cycles: reflecting a negative vision of deficit spending and debt, constraints that seriously undermined the ability of States to take counter-cyclical policies and had, instead, pro-cyclical effects. The other distortions are connected to the tools used by States to circumvent constraints. Each kind of constraint caused a modification in the budget composition; the balanced budget requirement generated incentives to leave off costs and activities, to underfund long-term commitments, and to move costs between years. Tax limitations -focused on property tax -created an incentive for the growth of sales and capital gains taxes and a system in which
States and local governments rely heavily on fees and intergovernmental transfers to gain sufficient revenues. Alongside this, there was an increase in the use of special districts or authorities to circumvent both the tax-increment limits and to finance services in deficit.
As previously shown, the composition of indebtedness is another element distorted by the combination of the fiscal rules and by the interpretative activities of the courts that "concede" some kind of debt. Moreover, the combination of the commitment assumed through distorted financing mechanisms and the limited autonomy in the revenue sector created an overall restriction of spaces for policies in the budget, restricting the percentage of modifiable items present.
The weakness in the constraints, and the deferential interpretative approach of the courts, erodes the effectiveness of constraints. 
